Reallocation with priorities
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6188682
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.015zbMath1530.91433OpenAlexW3188211840MaRDI QIDQ6188682
Julien Combe, Jan Christoph Schlegel
Publication date: 11 January 2024
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.015
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
- Non-bossiness
- Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
- The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
- House allocation with existing tenants
- On cores and indivisibility
- Stable matchings and rematching-proof equilibria in a two-sided matching market
- An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm
- Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
- A dynamic school choice model
- School Choice with Consent*
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- MATCHING MARKETS WITH MIXED OWNERSHIP: THE CASE FOR A REAL‐LIFE ASSIGNMENT MECHANISM*
- Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources
This page was built for publication: Reallocation with priorities
