Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2023.12.002zbMath1530.91442OpenAlexW4389538031MaRDI QIDQ6188684

Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez, Adriana Piazza

Publication date: 11 January 2024

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.12.002

zbMATH Keywords

matching marketsexternalitiescoalitional stabilityrandom preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

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