Independent versus collective expertise

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2023.12.001zbMath1530.91084MaRDI QIDQ6188685

No author found.

Publication date: 11 January 2024

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

cheap talkinformation aggregationreputation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Competitive cheap talk
• Eliciting information from multiple experts
• Should straw polls be banned?
• Deliberative voting
• Professional advice
• Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information
• A Model of Expertise
• Advice from Multiple Experts: A Comparison of Simultaneous, Sequential, and Hierarchical Communication
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Is Transparency To No Avail?*
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
• Deliberation and Voting Rules

This page was built for publication: Independent versus collective expertise