The liar paradox and ``meaningless revenge
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Publication:6191136
DOI10.1007/s10992-023-09719-2OpenAlexW4388731738MaRDI QIDQ6191136
Publication date: 9 February 2024
Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-023-09719-2
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