A dynamic model of censorship

DOI10.3982/te4639OpenAlexW4391139435WikidataQ129390184 ScholiaQ129390184MaRDI QIDQ6194357

Unnamed Author

Publication date: 19 March 2024

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te4639

zbMATH Keywords

learningdynamic gamescensorshipinformation manipulation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites Work

• Reputation and Survival: Learning in a Dynamic Signalling Model
• Poisson Version of the Two-Armed Bandit Problem with Discounting
• Random Inspections and Periodic Reviews: Optimal Dynamic Monitoring
• Breakdowns
• Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change*
• Community Enforcement of Trust with Bounded Memory
• Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits
• Reputation for Quality
• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments

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