Worst‐case equilibria in first‐price auctions

DOI10.3982/te4555OpenAlexW4391139476WikidataQ129416717 ScholiaQ129416717MaRDI QIDQ6194358

Helene Mass, Vitali Gretschko

Publication date: 19 March 2024

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te4555

zbMATH Keywords

uncertaintyauctionsworst-case equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites Work

• Ambiguous beliefs and mechanism design
• Robust screening under ambiguity
• Robust monopoly pricing
• Sealed bid auctions with uncertainty averse bidders
• Learning to play Bayesian games.
• Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions
• Knightian decision theory. I.
• Robust bidding and revenue in descending price auctions
• The fog of fraud -- mitigating fraud by strategic ambiguity
• Crowdsourced Bayesian auctions
• The Design of Ambiguous Mechanisms
• Mechanism design with maxmin agents: Theory and an application to bilateral trade
• First-Price Auctions With General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue
• Knightian Analysis of the Vickrey Mechanism
• Self-Confirming Equilibrium

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