Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs
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Publication:6194359
DOI10.3982/te4259OpenAlexW4391139565MaRDI QIDQ6194359
Publication date: 19 March 2024
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te4259
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