Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness

DOI10.3982/TE5117OpenAlexW3121344179MaRDI QIDQ6194365

Sarah Auster, Nicola Pavoni

Publication date: 19 March 2024

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te5117

zbMATH Keywords

unawarenessoptimal delegationrenegotiation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
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• Optimal Delegation

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