Sophisticated banking contracts and fragility when withdrawal information is public

DOI10.3982/te5178OpenAlexW4391146916WikidataQ129409717 ScholiaQ129409717MaRDI QIDQ6194366

Xuesong Huang

Publication date: 19 March 2024

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te5178

zbMATH Keywords

bank runspublic informationforward inductioncorrelated typessophisticated contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites Work

• Optimal banking contracts and financial fragility
• Enriching information to prevent bank runs
• Run equilibria in the Green-Lin model of financial intermediation
• Bank incentives, contract design and bank runs
• Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation
• Currency stability using blockchain technology
• Discussion of: ``Currency stability using blockchain technology
• The role of independence in the Green-Lin Diamond-Dybvig model
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
• A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium
• Minimizing a Submodular Function on a Lattice
• Preventing bank runs
• Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning

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