The impact of core constraints on truthful bidding in combinatorial auctions

DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2024.114467OpenAlexW4392266822MaRDI QIDQ6196839

Roger Wattenhofer, Younjoo Lee, Adrian Meier, Robin Fritsch, Kanye Ye Wang

Publication date: 15 March 2024

Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2024.114467

zbMATH Keywords

combinatorial auctionscore-selecting payment rulesnon-decreasing payment rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Theory of computing (68Qxx)

Cites Work

• Incentives in core-selecting auctions with single-minded bidders
• On core-selecting and core-competitive mechanisms for binary single-parameter auctions
• Core-selecting auctions with incomplete information
• Core-selecting package auctions
• Fair Payments for Efficient Allocations in Public Sector Combinatorial Auctions
• Incentives in Teams
• On the impossibility of core-selecting auctions
• Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions

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