Equilibrium and efficiency in conflict analysis incorporating permissibility
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Publication:6201669
DOI10.1007/978-3-031-33780-2_8OpenAlexW4377230833MaRDI QIDQ6201669
Publication date: 25 March 2024
Published in: Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-33780-2_8
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- Comparability of coalitions in committees with permission of voters by using desirability relation with hopefulness relation.
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