The price of anarchy in routing games as a function of the demand
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Publication:6201916
DOI10.1007/s10107-021-01701-7arXiv1907.10101OpenAlexW2997249616MaRDI QIDQ6201916
Roberto Cominetti, Marco Scarsini, Valerio Dose
Publication date: 21 February 2024
Published in: Mathematical Programming. Series A. Series B (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.10101
Games involving graphs (91A43) Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10) Traffic problems in operations research (90B20) Potential and congestion games (91A14)
Cites Work
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