Approval-based apportionment
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Publication:6201936
DOI10.1007/s10107-022-01852-1arXiv1911.08365OpenAlexW4288037860WikidataQ114228486 ScholiaQ114228486MaRDI QIDQ6201936
Markus Brill, Kai Wilker, Dominik Peters, Paul Gölz, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin
Publication date: 21 February 2024
Published in: Mathematical Programming. Series A. Series B (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.08365
Voting theory (91B12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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Cites Work
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