Approval-based apportionment

DOI10.1007/s10107-022-01852-1arXiv1911.08365OpenAlexW4288037860WikidataQ114228486 ScholiaQ114228486MaRDI QIDQ6201936

Markus Brill, Kai Wilker, Dominik Peters, Paul Gölz, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin

Publication date: 21 February 2024

Published in: Mathematical Programming. Series A. Series B (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.08365

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (1)

Phragmén's voting methods and justified representation

Cites Work

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• The Core of the Participatory Budgeting Problem
• The Bargaining Problem
• The Nash Social Welfare Function
• The Quota Method of Apportionment
• Approximately stable committee selection
• A piecewise contractive dynamical system and Phragmèn's election method
• Combinatorial optimization. Theory and algorithms

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