PERIODIC STRATEGIES: A NEW SOLUTION CONCEPT AND AN ALGORITHM FOR NONTRIVIAL STRATEGIC FORM GAMES

DOI10.1142/s0219525917500096arXiv1307.2035MaRDI QIDQ6203248

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Publication date: 27 March 2024

Published in: Advances in Complex Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1307.2035

zbMATH Keywords

game theorymathematical economicssolution conceptsstrategic form games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites Work

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• Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice Under Uncertainty
• On Forward Induction
• "Beliefs about Beliefs" without Probabilities
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

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