OPINION DYNAMICS AND COLLECTIVE DECISIONS

DOI10.1142/s0219525918020022arXiv2104.01855OpenAlexW3144468512MaRDI QIDQ6203279

Jan-Hendrik Lorenz, Martin Neumann

Publication date: 27 March 2024

Published in: Advances in Complex Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2104.01855

zbMATH Keywords

social choiceopinion dynamicssocial influenceagent-based modelingcollective decisions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites Work

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• Geometric models of consistent judgement aggregation
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
• Essentially lexicographic aggregation
• Dynamic models of segregation†
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Reaching a Consensus
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision

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