Weighted fair division with matroid-rank valuations: monotonicity and strategyproofness

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.09.004arXiv2303.14454MaRDI QIDQ6204157

Warut Suksompong, Nicholas J. Teh

Publication date: 9 April 2024

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.14454

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicityfair divisionstrategyproofnessunequal entitlementsmatroid-rank valuations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

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