Learning to mitigate epidemic risks: a dynamic population game approach
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Publication:6204715
DOI10.1007/s13235-023-00529-4OpenAlexW4387844773MaRDI QIDQ6204715
Saverio Bolognani, Urmee Maitra, Ashish R. Hota, Unnamed Author
Publication date: 2 April 2024
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00529-4
Epidemiology (92D30) Applications of game theory (91A80) Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Dynamic games (91A25)
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