The Shapley-Shubik index for multi-criteria simple games
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Publication:621701
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2010.08.013zbMath1208.91041OpenAlexW1964871357MaRDI QIDQ621701
Luisa Monroy, Francisco Ramón Fernández García
Publication date: 28 January 2011
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2010.08.013
multiple criteria analysisgroup decision-makingShapley-Shubik indexvoting systemsmulti-criteria simple games
Related Items (6)
Cooperation through social influence ⋮ Stable sets and cores for multi-criteria simple games and for their extensions ⋮ A novel multiperson game approach for linguistic multicriteria decision making problems ⋮ Weighted committee games ⋮ Banzhaf index for multiple voting systems. An application to the European Union ⋮ Set-weighted games and their application to the cover problem
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