Maskin monotonicity and infinite individuals

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2010.09.006zbMath1204.91049OpenAlexW2073305882MaRDI QIDQ621725

Susumu Cato

Publication date: 28 January 2011

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.09.006

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessinfinite individualsMaskin monotonicity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Stable preference aggregation with infinite population

Cites Work

• Another induction proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
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• The core of a game with a continuum of players and finite coalitions: The model and some results
• Domains of social choice functions on which coalition strategy-proofness and maskin monotonicity are equivalent
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• Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1.
• Monotonicity implies generalized strategy-proofness for correspondences
• The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Cheatproofness Properties of the Plurality Rule in Large Societies
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality

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