Robust solutions to Stackelberg games: addressing bounded rationality and limited observations in human cognition

DOI10.1016/J.ARTINT.2010.07.002zbMath1237.91065OpenAlexW2164945937MaRDI QIDQ622107

Manish Jain, Fernando Ordóñez, Milind Tambe, James Pita, Sarit Kraus

Publication date: 31 January 2011

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2010.07.002

zbMATH Keywords

uncertaintysecuritybehavioral game theoryStackelberg

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Cognitive psychology (91E10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (14)

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Uses Software

• IRIS

Cites Work

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