A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method
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Publication:622582
DOI10.1007/s00355-010-0475-4zbMath1232.91185OpenAlexW2037412278MaRDI QIDQ622582
Publication date: 3 February 2011
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0475-4
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Uses Software
Cites Work
- Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules
- Concorcet's principle implies the no show paradox
- Geometry of voting
- A continuous rating method for preferential voting. The incomplete case
- Approaches to Constructing a Stratified Merged Knowledge Base
- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
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