Political influence in multi-choice institutions: cyclicity, anonymity, and transitivity
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Publication:622633
DOI10.1007/s11238-010-9211-xzbMath1274.91370OpenAlexW2025974367MaRDI QIDQ622633
Lawrence Diffo Lambo, Roland Pongou, Bertrand Tchantcho
Publication date: 3 February 2011
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/18240/1/MPRA_paper_18240.pdf
transitivitycyclicityanonymityglobal influence relationlevel-based influence relationsmulti-choice institutionsparadox of power
Related Items (16)
On anonymous and weighted voting systems ⋮ Achievable hierarchies in voting games with abstention ⋮ Round-robin political tournaments: abstention, truthful equilibria, and effective power ⋮ Manipulation in games with multiple levels of output ⋮ Properties of ladder tournaments ⋮ On the ordinal equivalence of the Johnston, Banzhaf and Shapley power indices ⋮ The influence relation for ternary voting games ⋮ Comparing influence theories in voting games under locally generated measures of dissatisfaction ⋮ Probabilistic power indices for voting rules with abstention ⋮ A policy-based rationalization of collective rules: dimensionality, specialized houses, and decentralized authority ⋮ A parameterization for a class of complete games with abstention ⋮ On the ordinal equivalence of the Jonhston, Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power indices for voting games with abstention ⋮ Banzhaf index for multiple voting systems. An application to the European Union ⋮ A critical analysis on the notion of power ⋮ Public good indices for games with several levels of approval ⋮ A note on the ordinal equivalence of power indices in games with coalition structure
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