A general equilibrium analysis of corporate control and the stock market

DOI10.1007/S00199-009-0511-8zbMath1217.91108OpenAlexW2003322973MaRDI QIDQ623449

Klaus Ritzberger, Stefano De Michelis

Publication date: 14 February 2011

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0511-8

zbMATH Keywords

stock marketprofit maximizationnon-competitive marketshareholder voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50)

Related Items (10)

Production externalities: internalization by voting ⋮ Shareholder heterogeneity, asymmetric information, and the equilibrium manager ⋮ Existence and multiplicity of temporary equilibria under nominal price rigidities ⋮ A bargaining theory of the firm ⋮ Cournotian duopolistic firms may be Walrasian: a case in the Gabszewicz and Vial model ⋮ Ownership structure and efficiency in large economies ⋮ Codes of best practice in competitive markets for managers ⋮ Ownership structure and control in incomplete market economies with transferable utility ⋮ Indeterminacy of Cournot-Walras equilibrium with incomplete markets ⋮ Equilibrium CEO contract with belief heterogeneity

Cites Work

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• Profit maximization mitigates competition
• Shareholder voting
• Majority Voting and Corporate Control: The Rule of the Dominant Shareholder
• A Theory of Competitive Equilibrium in Stock Market Economies
• Tender Offers and Leverage
• Nonexistence of Constrained Efficient Equilibria When Markets are Incomplete
• Drèze equilibria and welfare maxima

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