A general equilibrium analysis of corporate control and the stock market
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Publication:623449
DOI10.1007/S00199-009-0511-8zbMath1217.91108OpenAlexW2003322973MaRDI QIDQ623449
Klaus Ritzberger, Stefano De Michelis
Publication date: 14 February 2011
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0511-8
Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50)
Related Items (10)
Production externalities: internalization by voting ⋮ Shareholder heterogeneity, asymmetric information, and the equilibrium manager ⋮ Existence and multiplicity of temporary equilibria under nominal price rigidities ⋮ A bargaining theory of the firm ⋮ Cournotian duopolistic firms may be Walrasian: a case in the Gabszewicz and Vial model ⋮ Ownership structure and efficiency in large economies ⋮ Codes of best practice in competitive markets for managers ⋮ Ownership structure and control in incomplete market economies with transferable utility ⋮ Indeterminacy of Cournot-Walras equilibrium with incomplete markets ⋮ Equilibrium CEO contract with belief heterogeneity
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