A strategic analysis of the war against transnational terrorism

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.06.010zbMath1205.91029OpenAlexW2091625349MaRDI QIDQ625035

Eva Cárceles-Poveda, Yair Tauman

Publication date: 11 February 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.06.010

zbMATH Keywords

conflict resolutionproactive and defensive measuresstrategic interactionstransnational terrorism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) History, political science (91F10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (7)

Resource allocation in an asymmetric technology race with temporary advantages ⋮ Self-enforcing collective counterterror retaliation ⋮ Why direct counter‐terrorism measures only may fail: An analysis of direct and preventive counter‐terrorism measures ⋮ Interdependent defense games with applications to internet security at the level of autonomous systems ⋮ Cybersecurity investments in the supply chain: coordination and a strategic attacker ⋮ Governments' and Terrorists' Defense and Attack in a T-Period Game ⋮ Information Security Investment When Hackers Disseminate Knowledge

Cites Work

• Whether to attack a terrorist's resource stock today or tomorrow

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