No trade
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Publication:625036
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.09.006zbMath1205.91071OpenAlexW4231404330MaRDI QIDQ625036
Juan D. Carrillo, Thomas R. Palfrey
Publication date: 11 February 2011
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.09.006
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44) Experimental studies (91A90)
Related Items (6)
Do sellers exploit biased beliefs of buyers? An experiment ⋮ Adverse selection and contingent reasoning in preadolescents and teenagers ⋮ Information frictions and market power: a laboratory study ⋮ An experimental analysis of information acquisition in prediction markets ⋮ Quantal response and nonequilibrium beliefs explain overbidding in maximum-value auctions ⋮ Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory
Cites Work
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- The sealed-bid mechnism: An experimental study
- Information, trade and common knowledge
- Bargaining with common values
- Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
- Heterogeneous quantal response equilibrium and cognitive hierarchies
- Analogy-based expectation equilibrium
- Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations
- Information, trade and incomplete markets
- No-Trade in the Laboratory
- Bargaining under Incomplete Information
- Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
- On the Possibility of Speculation under Rational Expectations
- Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information
- A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
- Sequential Bargaining with Correlated Values
- Cursed Equilibrium
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