Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play
From MaRDI portal
Publication:625038
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.11.014zbMath1205.91028OpenAlexW3123760098MaRDI QIDQ625038
Drew Fudenberg, Satoru Takahashi
Publication date: 11 February 2011
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.11.014
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