Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.11.002zbMath1205.91030OpenAlexW3123991108MaRDI QIDQ625045

George J. Mailath, Wojciech Olszewski

Publication date: 11 February 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.11.002

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesfolk theoremimperfect monitoringbounded recall strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (14)

Bounded memory folk theorem ⋮ Markov stationary equilibria in stochastic supermodular games with imperfect private and public information ⋮ Limited records and reputation bubbles ⋮ Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring ⋮ Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring ⋮ Variable temptations and black mark reputations ⋮ Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring ⋮ Restricted feedback in long term relationships ⋮ Instability of belief-free equilibria ⋮ Bounded memory and incomplete information ⋮ Strategies that enforce linear payoff relationships under observation errors in repeated prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal ⋮ Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma ⋮ Recall and private monitoring

Cites Work

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• How Robust Is the Folk Theorem?^*
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• Informational Constraints and the Overlapping Generations Model: Folk and Anti-Folk Theorems
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring
• A Minority Game with Bounded Recall
• Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games

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