A unified approach to comparative statics puzzles in experiments
From MaRDI portal
Publication:625048
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.07.008zbMath1205.91039OpenAlexW3121995267MaRDI QIDQ625048
Publication date: 11 February 2011
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.07.008
supermodularitycomparative staticsstrategic complementaritylevel-\(k\) reasoningquantal-response equilibrium
Related Items (2)
Promises and conventions -- an approach to pre-play agreements ⋮ Are the treasures of game theory ambiguous?
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
- Playing safe in coordination games: The roles of risk dominance, payoff dominance, and history of play
- Mixed equilibria in games of strategic complementarities
- Risk averse behavior in generalized matching pennies games.
- Potential games
- Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
- On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
- An experimental study of costly coordination
- Forward induction and entry deterrence: an experiment
- Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
- Minimizing a Submodular Function on a Lattice
- Monotone Comparative Statics
- Do People Rely on the Self-Interested Maximization of Others? An Experimental Test
- Comparative Statics by Adaptive Dynamics and the Correspondence Principle
- Minimum-effort coordination games: Stochastic potential and logit equilibrium
This page was built for publication: A unified approach to comparative statics puzzles in experiments
