Concrete possible worlds and counterfactual conditionals: Lewis versus Williamson on modal knowledge

DOI10.1007/S11229-009-9571-3zbMath1214.03006OpenAlexW2070942727MaRDI QIDQ625713

Andrea Sauchelli

Publication date: 25 February 2011

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9571-3

zbMATH Keywords

possible worldsmodalitycounterfactual thinkingmodal epistemology

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logic in the philosophy of science (03A10)

Cites Work

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• Counterfactuals and comparative possibility
• Impossible worlds: A modest approach
• First-order modal logic
• ``Four-valued semantics for the relevant logic R
• Carnap's Metaontology
• A Modal Fictionalist Result

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