The pseudo-average rule: bankruptcy, cost allocation and bargaining

DOI10.1007/S00186-010-0333-2zbMath1209.49057OpenAlexW1975636868MaRDI QIDQ627454

Txus Ortells, Juan Carlos Santos

Publication date: 2 March 2011

Published in: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-010-0333-2

zbMATH Keywords

balanced contributionscost allocationbargainingbankruptcyrationingequal areaclaims problempseudo-average solution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of optimal control and differential games (49N90) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (3)

Equal Area Rule to Adjudicate Conflicting Claims ⋮ GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF BANKRUPTCY AND TAXATION PROBLEMS: RECENT ADVANCES ⋮ Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update

Cites Work

• Cost allocation schemes: An asymptotic approach
• Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
• Conference structures and fair allocation rules
• Monotonicity and dummy free property for multi-choice cooperative games
• The bankruptcy problem: A cooperative bargaining approach
• Average cost pricing versus serial cost sharing: An axiomatic comparison
• Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey.
• On the serial cost sharing rule
• Characterizations of a multi-choice value
• A Shapley value for games with restricted coalitions
• An Introduction to Allocation Rules
• Serial Cost Sharing
• Values of Non-Atomic Games
• A value for multichoice games

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