Voting paradoxes and group coherence. The Condorcet efficiency of voting rules.
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Publication:628561
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-03107-6zbMath1252.91001OpenAlexW2493647195MaRDI QIDQ628561
Dominique Lepelley, William V. Gehrlein
Publication date: 11 March 2011
Published in: Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03107-6
Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)
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