Communication, timing, and common learning

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2010.08.009zbMath1244.91019OpenAlexW2114221286MaRDI QIDQ629332

Jakub Steiner, Colin Stewart

Publication date: 9 March 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/174751/1/communication2.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

communicationlearningcommon knowledge

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (3)

Observing each other's observations in a Bayesian coordination game ⋮ Common learning with intertemporal dependence ⋮ A model of belief influence in large social networks

Cites Work

• We can't disagree forever
• Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
• Comment of consensus without common knowledge
• Infinite divisibility and generalized subexponentiality
• Communication, consensus, and knowledge
• Knowledge and common knowledge in a distributed environment
• Common Learning
• Coordinated action in the electronic mail game
• Common knowledge and consensus with noisy communication

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