Knightian games and robustness to ambiguity
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Publication:629333
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2010.08.008zbMath1244.91018OpenAlexW2056835800MaRDI QIDQ629333
Publication date: 9 March 2011
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.08.008
Related Items (9)
Variational preferences and equilibria in games under ambiguous belief correspondences ⋮ A framework for robustness to ambiguity of higher-order beliefs ⋮ Trembles in extensive games with ambiguity averse players ⋮ Robustness of equilibrium in the Kyle model of informed speculation ⋮ Ellsberg games ⋮ Kuhn's theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games ⋮ Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games ⋮ Strategic cautiousness as an expression of robustness to ambiguity ⋮ Strategic uncertainty and equilibrium selection in discontinuous games
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