Groups, collective decisions and markets
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Publication:629334
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2010.10.004zbMath1244.91032OpenAlexW2008689585MaRDI QIDQ629334
Publication date: 9 March 2011
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.10.004
Related Items (4)
Power at general equilibrium ⋮ The roommate problem with externalities ⋮ Households, markets and public choice ⋮ Household formation and markets
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