Are incentives against economic justice?

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2010.10.005zbMath1244.91039OpenAlexW2025069133MaRDI QIDQ629336

Rodrigo A. Velez

Publication date: 9 March 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.10.005

zbMATH Keywords

fairnessefficiencyimplementationmechanism designno-envymanipulationindivisible goodsgeneralized money Rawlsian fair solutions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Public goods (91B18) Group preferences (91B10)

Related Items (14)

Sharing an increase of the rent fairly ⋮ Joint misrepresentation with bribes ⋮ Incentives and justice for sequencing problems ⋮ A polynomial algorithm for maxmin and minmax envy-free rent division on a soft budget ⋮ Divide and compromise ⋮ An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy‐free and budget‐balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities ⋮ Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market ⋮ Rental harmony with roommates ⋮ Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money ⋮ Equitable rent division on a soft budget ⋮ Let them cheat! ⋮ Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities ⋮ Fully Polynomial-Time Approximation Schemes for Fair Rent Division ⋮ The costs and benefits of symmetry in common-ownership allocation problems

Cites Work

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• The Manipulability of Resource Allocation Mechanisms
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• Distortion of Utilities and the Bargaining Problem
• Toward Natural Implementation
• Manipulation of preferences and relative utilitarianism

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