A relation-algebraic approach to simple games

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2010.09.006zbMath1207.90064OpenAlexW3125880702MaRDI QIDQ631101

Agnieszka Rusinowska, Stefan Bolus, Rudolf Berghammer, H. C. M. De Swart

Publication date: 22 March 2011

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2010.09.006

zbMATH Keywords

relation algebrasimple game\texttt{RelView}central playerdominant playerwinning coalition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Symbolic computation and algebraic computation (68W30) Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) History, political science (91F10) Combinatorial games (91A46)

Related Items (7)

Implicit power indices for measuring indirect control in corporate structures ⋮ Column-Wise Extendible Vector Expressions and the Relational Computation of Sets of Sets ⋮ Computing and visualizing Banks sets of dominance relations using relation algebra and RelView ⋮ Dynamic programming for computing power indices for weighted voting games with precoalitions ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Set-weighted games and their application to the cover problem ⋮ Monte Carlo methods for the Shapley-Shubik power index

Uses Software

• RelView
• Rath

Cites Work

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• Power indices of simple games and vector-weighted majority games by means of binary decision diagrams
• The complexity of computing the permanent
• Characterizations of the Deegan-Packel and Johnston power indices
• Applying relational algebra and REL VIEW to coalition formation
• NP-completeness of some problems concerning voting games
• Applying relation algebra and RelView to solve problems on orders and lattices
• Simple games and weighted games: A theoretical and computational viewpoint
• Applying relation algebra and RelView to measures in a social network
• On connected coalitions in dominated simple games
• An axiomatization of the Banzhaf value
• Coalition formation in simple games with dominant players
• On the uniqueness of the Shapley value
• A new index of power for simple n-person games
• Faster algorithms for computing power indices in weighted voting games
• An interdisciplinary approach to coalition formation
• Computing power indices: multilinear extensions and new characterizations
• Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf Indices Revisited
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
• Relational Methods in Computer Science
• Relational Methods in Computer Science
• Theory and Applications of Relational Structures as Knowledge Instruments

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