Implementation via mechanisms with transfers

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2010.10.004zbMath1208.91045OpenAlexW2068320927MaRDI QIDQ631122

Jianxin Yi

Publication date: 22 March 2011

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2010.10.004

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicitytransfersNash implementationsemi-monotonicity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

Double implementation in Nash and \(M\)-Nash equilibria ⋮ Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions

Cites Work

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