Consolidating or non-consolidating queues: a game theoretic queueing model with holding costs

DOI10.1016/j.orl.2010.09.011zbMath1207.90044OpenAlexW2154190290MaRDI QIDQ631195

Kwan-Eng Wee, Ananth V. Iyer

Publication date: 22 March 2011

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/3208

zbMATH Keywords

queueinggame theoryNash equilibriumincentivesholding cost allocationservice rate

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Queues and service in operations research (90B22)

Related Items (3)

Finite uniform approximation of two-person games defined on a product of staircase-function infinite spaces ⋮ Decentralized bandwidth control subject to two-layer constraints ⋮ Pooling Queues with Strategic Servers: The Effects of Customer Ownership

Cites Work

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• Incentive Effects Favor Nonconsolidating Queues in a Service System: The Principal–Agent Perspective
• Obtaining Fast Service in a Queueing System via Performance-Based Allocation of Demand
• Contracting and Information Sharing Under Supply Chain Competition
• Optimal control of a queueing system with two heterogeneous servers
• Individual versus Social Optimization in the Allocation of Customers to Alternative Servers
• The slow server problem: a queue with stalling
• Optimal Service Speeds in a Competitive Environment

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