Environmental policy and stable collusion: the case of a dynamic polluting oligopoly

DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2010.12.003zbMath1209.91119OpenAlexW2006513986MaRDI QIDQ631246

Hassan Benchekroun, Amrita Ray Chaudhuri

Publication date: 22 March 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2010.12.003

zbMATH Keywords

differential gameoligopolycoalition formationpollution taxcartel formation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Related Items (1)

Optimal taxation in a common resource oligopoly game

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control
• On merger profitability in a Cournot setting
• Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction
• Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements
• SUSTAINABILITY OF COOPERATION OVERTIME IN LINEAR-QUADRATIC DIFFERENTIAL GAMES
• Time consistent side payments in a dynamic game of downstream pollution

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