Strategic risk and coordination failure in blame games

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.10.018zbMath1207.91009OpenAlexW2089538726MaRDI QIDQ631263

Tore Ellingsen, Robert Östling

Publication date: 22 March 2011

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.10.018

zbMATH Keywords

coordination gamescoordination failurestrategic riskweak-link games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Cites Work

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