The entry incentives of complementary producers: a simple model with implications for antitrust policy

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.11.013zbMath1207.91035OpenAlexW3122605568MaRDI QIDQ631279

Nathan H. Miller, Juan Sebastián Lleras

Publication date: 22 March 2011

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/202386

zbMATH Keywords

complementary productsentry incentivesvertical mergers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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