Location of response facilities: a simultaneous game between state and terrorist

DOI10.1504/IJOR.2011.037265zbMath1207.91019MaRDI QIDQ631965

Oded Berman, Arieh Gavious, Rong-Bing Huang

Publication date: 14 March 2011

Published in: International Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryfacilities locationsimultaneous gamesterrorists

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) History, political science (91F10)

Related Items (4)

On the value of exposure and secrecy of defense system: first-mover advantage vs. robustness ⋮ A game‐theoretic approach for the location of terror response facilities with both disruption risk and hidden information ⋮ Optimal sensor deployment to increase the security of the maximal breach path in border surveillance ⋮ Incorporating the threat of terrorist attacks in the design of public service facility networks

Uses Software

• Gambit

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