The insider's curse
From MaRDI portal
Publication:632956
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.05.007zbMath1208.91052OpenAlexW1548393456MaRDI QIDQ632956
Ángel Hernando-Veciana, Michael Troege
Publication date: 28 March 2011
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.05.007
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)
Related Items (5)
Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Volunteering and the strategic value of ignorance ⋮ Looking smart versus playing dumb in common-value auctions ⋮ The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders ⋮ Risky procurement with an insider bidder
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- The value of information for auctioneers
- Information revelation in auctions
- Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids
- Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions
- The value of information in a sealed-bid auction
- Asymmetric English auctions.
- Can the seller benefit from an insider in common-value auctions?
- Information structures in optimal auctions
- Log-concave probability and its applications
- Second-price common-value auctions under multidimensional uncertainty
- Equilibria in open common value auctions
- A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information
- Strategic Information Revelation
- Signal Orderings Based on Dispersion and the Supply of Private Information in Auctions
- Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
- Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
- The Value of Public Information in Monopoly
- Information Acquisition in Auctions
- Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
- Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
- On the Value of Competition in Procurement Auctions
This page was built for publication: The insider's curse