Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.05.008zbMath1210.91019OpenAlexW2067131946MaRDI QIDQ632963

Itai Sher

Publication date: 28 March 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.05.008

zbMATH Keywords

evidenceconcavitydeterminismcredibilitycommitmentoptimal persuasion rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Decision theory for games (91A35)

Related Items (10)

Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion ⋮ Persuasion and dynamic communication ⋮ Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification ⋮ On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games ⋮ Information transmission in voluntary disclosure games ⋮ Equilibrium refinement in finite action evidence games ⋮ EFFECTIVE PERSUASION ⋮ Simple versus rich language in disclosure games ⋮ Evidence reading mechanisms ⋮ Strategic communication with reporting costs

Cites Work

• The burden of proof in a game of persuasion
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Persuasion and dynamic communication
• On Optimal Rules of Persuasion
• Disclosures and Asset Returns
• Debates and decisions: On a rationale of argumentation rules.

This page was built for publication: Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion