Optimal bilateral trade of multiple objects

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.04.005zbMath1208.91086OpenAlexW2041316801MaRDI QIDQ632972

Ady Pauzner, Ran Eilat

Publication date: 28 March 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/275716/files/12-2008.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingmechanism designbilateral tradeprivate valuesbuyer-seller problemmultiple objects

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic models in economics (91B70) Trade models (91B60) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• A note on budget balance under interim participation constraints: The case of independent types
• Mathematical tools for hazard function analysis.
• A note on linked bargaining
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
• Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Optimal Multi-Object Auctions
• Bundling and Optimal Auctions of Multiple Products