Maximum distance between Slater orders and Copeland orders of tournaments
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Publication:633222
DOI10.1007/s11083-010-9155-3zbMath1214.05038OpenAlexW2038553532MaRDI QIDQ633222
Publication date: 31 March 2011
Published in: Order (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11083-010-9155-3
arc-disjoint circuits in circular tournamentsCopeland ordersCopeland winnersmajority tournamentSlater ordersSlater winnerssymmetric difference distancetournament solutions
Partial orders, general (06A06) Voting theory (91B12) Directed graphs (digraphs), tournaments (05C20)
Related Items
A linear ordering problem of sets ⋮ An updated survey on the linear ordering problem for weighted or unweighted tournaments
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