Bargaining outcomes in patent licensing: asymptotic results in a general Cournot market
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Publication:633347
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2010.12.001zbMath1208.91055OpenAlexW2015319631MaRDI QIDQ633347
Naoki Watanabe, Shin Kishimoto, Shigeo Muto
Publication date: 31 March 2011
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2241/113171
Cooperative games (91A12) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (8)
Consistency requirements and pattern methods in cost sharing problems with technological cooperation ⋮ Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game: the existence proof ⋮ On the core of a patent licensing game ⋮ Stable bargaining outcomes in patent licensing: a cooperative game approach without side payments ⋮ The kernel of a patent licensing game: the optimal number of licensees ⋮ Farsighted stability in patent licensing: an abstract game approach ⋮ An analysis of technology licensing and parallel importation under different market structures ⋮ Calmness of a perturbed Cournot Oligopoly Game with nonsmooth cost functions
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