Strategic sourcing for entry deterrence and tacit collusion

DOI10.1007/S00712-010-0165-9zbMath1208.91051OpenAlexW2047016737MaRDI QIDQ633772

Yutian Chen

Publication date: 30 March 2011

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-010-0165-9

zbMATH Keywords

Cournot competitionStackelberg competitionsourcingentry deterrence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

To make or to buy from a common supplier? Strategic considerations and welfare consequences ⋮ A theoretical analysis of collusion involving technology licensing under diseconomies of scale ⋮ Strategic outsourcing decisions of new entrant and competing incumbent manufacturer in a supply chain with common supplier

Cites Work

• The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs
• Explaining cross-supplies
• Commitment and observability in games
• The Make-or-Buy Decision in the Presence of a Rival: Strategic Outsourcing to a Common Supplier

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