Limited liability and the risk-incentive relationship

DOI10.1007/S00712-010-0183-7zbMath1208.91078OpenAlexW2056238991MaRDI QIDQ633781

Matthias Kräkel, Jörg Budde

Publication date: 30 March 2011

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-010-0183-7

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardlimited liabilityrisk-incentive relationship

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (2)

Moral hazard in innovation: the relationship between risk aversion and performance pay ⋮ An experimental investigation of the `tenuous trade-off' between risk and incentives in organizations

Cites Work

• Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion
• Comparing location experiments
• Pay-performance sensitivity and production uncertainty
• The risk and incentives trade-off in the presence of heterogeneous managers
• Risk sharing vs. incentives: contract design under two-sided heterogeneity
• A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences*
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Efficiency of an Information System in an Agency Model
• Ranking of information systems in agency models: an integral condition

This page was built for publication: Limited liability and the risk-incentive relationship