On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure

DOI10.1007/s10058-009-0099-2zbMath1208.91057OpenAlexW3121250409MaRDI QIDQ633787

Vasiliki Skreta

Publication date: 30 March 2011

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://archive.nyu.edu/handle/2451/26019

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designinformed principalinformation disclosureoptimal auctionscorrelated information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (12)

Informed seller with taste heterogeneity ⋮ Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values ⋮ Informed principal problems in bilateral trading ⋮ On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals ⋮ Private disclosure with multiple agents ⋮ Informed-principal problem with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and no limited liability ⋮ Optimal auction design under non-commitment ⋮ The strategically ignorant principal ⋮ Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction ⋮ Revealing information in auctions: the optimal auction versus the second-price auction ⋮ Selling with evidence ⋮ Equivalence and revenue comparison among identical-item auctions

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