On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
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Publication:633787
DOI10.1007/s10058-009-0099-2zbMath1208.91057OpenAlexW3121250409MaRDI QIDQ633787
Publication date: 30 March 2011
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://archive.nyu.edu/handle/2451/26019
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)
Related Items (12)
Informed seller with taste heterogeneity ⋮ Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values ⋮ Informed principal problems in bilateral trading ⋮ On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals ⋮ Private disclosure with multiple agents ⋮ Informed-principal problem with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and no limited liability ⋮ Optimal auction design under non-commitment ⋮ The strategically ignorant principal ⋮ Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction ⋮ Revealing information in auctions: the optimal auction versus the second-price auction ⋮ Selling with evidence ⋮ Equivalence and revenue comparison among identical-item auctions
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